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DEDICATION 
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN DIXON: TWENTY YEARS 
IN RETROSPECT* 
PAUL R. BAIER** 
[K]nowing that when one's work is done, generally there is 
someone, sooner or later, who sees the aim and judges the 
success.1 
There is a glimpse of the universal in the particular of John 
• [Editors' note: John A. Dixon, Jr., a distinguished graduate of Tulane Law School, 
retired as Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court on April 8, 1990. His twenty years 
of service on the Louisiana Supreme Court have been a model of judicial courage, integrity, 
wisdom, and quiet achievement. Chief Justice Dixon has brought great stature to 
Louisiana's judiciary. When he announced his retirement, the Louisiana Bar Association 
insisted on paying tribute to Chief Justice Dixon--0ver his self-effacing protest-by public 
ceremonies conducted in the Louisiana Supreme Court on March 27, 1990. One of the 
Speakers, Professor Paul R. Baier, spoke for Louisiana's legal academic community, and 
sketched Chief Justice Dixon's determined quest for justice under law. Professor Baier's 
annotated remarks are presented here. The Tulane Law Review proudly dedicates this issue 
�o Chief Justice Dixon. His simplicity of Jiving and strong sense of justice are an 
tnspiration to all of us.] 
•• Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, and 
Scholar in Residence, Louisiana Bar Foundation. J.D. 1969, Harvard Law School; Judicial 
Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-1976. The author wishes to thank Mrs. 
Caroleen Hodges for her swift management of the m anuscript and years of devoted service 
to the LSU Law Center. 
I. o.w. HOLMES, Twenty Years in Retrospect, in THE OccASIONAL SPEECHES OF 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 154, 157 (M. Howe ed. 1962). 
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Dixon's life-both as a man and as a judge. Beauty in life and 
truth in law achieve a measure of objectivity through the spartan 
example of Louisiana's great and good chief justice and son, 
John Allen Dixon, Jr.,2 running aside his life's companion 
Imogene in the rosy dawn of the French Quarter, later strug­
gling in chambers "to infuse justice in the relationship between 
the State ... and the private person. "3 
As a ninth grader at Fair Park High School in Shreveport, 
John Dixon worked with his hands and measuring tools to 
square a block of walnut-"Six inches long, four inches wide, 
one inch t hick." He experienced "the sweet smell of fresh wood 
being worked"-these are his own words-and learned the les­
son of working with one's hands. "If a man who works with his 
hands is injured, he goes hungry," the Judge told me in cham­
bers. "I approach a workm an's compensation case from the 
point of view of a man who has been injured." I hear an echo of 
Mr. Berry's shop class in Justice Dixon's opinion for this Court, 
restoring money damages insensitively cut by a lower court from 
a man who had lost an eye. The case is Walker v. Champion:' 
Listen to the voice of Justice Dixon and hear the echo for 
yourself: 
Plaintiff dropped out of school when he finished the ninth 
grade .... 
. . . Terry Davis' employability is now limited because of 
the loss of his eye. It is even more limited because he is suited 
only for unskilled labor. . . . 
The inconvenience of an artificial eye is no small matter. 
�- Born in Orange, Texas, April 8, 1920, son of John A. and Louella Stark Dixon. 
Family mov� to Hay�esville, Louisiana, and thence to Shreveport. Student reporter, The P�wwow, Fair Park High School, Shreveport, Louisiana. B.A. 194-0, Centenary College. 
History teacher and basketball coach, Tallulah High School, 1940-1942. Enlisted U.S. 
�rmy, 505th �arachute Infantry Regiment, 1942. Captured in Sicily, prisoner of war for 
months, discharged Staff Sergeant October 1945 Married I sh
· I f 
Hindsville Arkans 0 t be 20 1945 
' . mogene •P ey o 
• as, c 0 r ' · LLB. 1947, Tulane University. Assistant District 
�t!�rn� of S�r1veport, 1947�1957. District Judge of the First Judicial District, 1957-
A 
· .  o�rt � ppeal Jud�e. m the Second Circuit of the State of Louisiana, 1968-1971 ssoc1ate ust1ce of the Lou1S1ana Supreme Court 1971-1980 Ch· f J · f L · · 
· 
March 1, 1980 to April 8 1990 H bb' ' . 
· te usttce o ou1s1ana, 
woodworking, golf. Three chtldren· 
.
Stell� 
l�s: running (Boston Marathon, 1982), 
John, Lester, Samuel, Luke, and lri�. 
, Diana, and Jeannette. Five grandchildren: 
3. Board of Comm'rs v Splend Sh' · 
1973). 
. our ippmg & Enters. Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 25 (La 
4. 288 So. 2d 44 (La. 1973). 
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It must be removed each morning and washed to remove the 
body fluids that accumulate on it. s 
3 
Only a judge of supreme sympathy for the common man 
and of th� leanest prose could write these lines. Thus the rough 
edges of life are smoothed down by the plane of the law in the 
hands of a judge who likes woodworking. 
The other day Mrs. Dixon showed me the Judge's work­
bench of mahogany, cherry, walnut-whatever was around. 
"He made it himself," she said with pride. And she pointed my 
eye to a sturdy mahogany plane made by the Judge on the week­
end. "He likes to make his own tools," I was told. 
I shall have more to say in a moment of the relationship 
between John Dixon as woodcrafter at home and his quest to do 
justice as a judge in chambers. There are common elements I 
believe. I will end with a reference to the hearth of their family 
home on St. Ann Street-a simple fireside facing the Shaker 
table on which John Dixon breaks Imogene's freshly baked, high 
protein, daily bread. The Judge built the table himself because 
he could find none that would fit perfectly behind their sofa. "It 
fits," the Judge told me laconically when I asked about it. 
Cicero in his essay "On Old Age," De Senectute in the 
Latin, speaks of the arms best adapted to old age: 
the attainment and practice of the virtues; if cultivated at every 
period of life these produce wonderful fruits when you reach 
old age, not only because they never fail-though that too is an 
important consideration-but also because the consciousness of 
a life well spent and the recollection of many virtuous deeds 
afford great satisfaction. 6 
John Dixon read these lines a half century ago in his Latin 
course at Centenary College.7 And more: "Care must be 
bestowed upon health; moderate exercise should be taken; food 
and drink should be sufficient to recruit, not overburden, our 
strength. . . . Whereas overexertion weighs the body down with 
fatigue, exercise makes the mind buoyant. "8 
I'm told the Judge eats a sandwich and a snack out of a 
5. Id. at 46-47. 
6. M. CICERO, On Old Age, in THE BASIC WORKS OF CICERO 125, 130 (M. Hadas ed. 
1951). 
7. His Centenary College record for 1936-1937 shows six semester hours earned in 
Latin I 03-104. As a student, Chief Justice Dixon read selections from Vergil's Aeneid and 
Cicero's De Senectute. 
8. M. CICERO, supra note 6, at 139. 
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brown paper bag after a round of golf with Imo, while others 
retire to the country club for heavier intake. Our Chief's run­
ning is legend. 9 It relieves the tension of his high office. I think 
of the picture in the American Bar Association Journal of lean 
John Dixon running a marathon. 10 That picture made me proud 
to be a member of Louisiana's legal profession. 
At seventy, Chief Justice Dixon is a paradigm of wisdom 
two thousand years old. "It is the subdued and unemotional 
style that best becomes [old age], and the calm and mild dis­
course of a veteran often wins itself a hearing,"11 says Cicero. 
"What is more charming than an old age surrounded by the 
enthusiasm of youth? Shall we not concede old age even 
strength to teach the young, to train and equip them for the 
duties of life? What can be nobler?"12 
Judge Dixon's family of law clerks comes immediately to 
mind. He was a wise father to each. On the eve of retirement 
Chief Justice Dixon revisited Cicero and re-read De Senectute in 
English translation. 13 I offer one additional selection as a mea­
sure of beauty in John Dixon's life: "what a blessing it is for the 
soul to be with itself, to live, as the phrase is, apart, discharged 
from the service of lust, ambition, strife, enmities, and all pas-
9. John Dixon completed his first Boston Marathon in 1982, two years after 
becoming Chief Justice. He collapsed across the finish line. Characteristically, however, he 
finished what he set out to do: run 26 miles, 385 yards. In 1983, he broke the state record 
in the sbtty-and-over bracket in the Mardi Gras Marathon across the Lake Pontchartrain 
Causeway. 
10. See Middleton, Judge on the Run, 69 A.B.A. J. 433, 433 (1983). The article noted that Chief Justice Dixon, at age 63, ran six marathons in three years: 
Id. 
Dixon didn't, at first, have his sights set on becoming a marathon runner. 
But when he became chief justice he found the new demands of the job prevented 
him from getting any exercise. "A combination of things led to insomnia" he 
said, so he decided to try running. 
' 
He and his wife, who live in New Orleans' French Quarter, began a routine 
5:30 a .. m. outing. While she progressed to about two miles per run, he began averagmg closer to 70 miles a week, qualifying him for the Boston Marathon. 
11. M. CICERO, supra note 6, at 137. 
12. Id. 
13. Judge Dixon's reading Cicero at 70 is reminiscent of Justice Holmes's d' 
Pl 90 A H l I · · 
rea mg ato at . s o mes exp amed to President Roosevelt: "You see I am reading now for the day of J.udgment, so as not to dead [flunk] if I am called up on some book that ever gentleman IS expected to have read." 0. WISTER, ROOSEVELT: THE STORY OF 
� FRIENDSHIP 133 (1930), quoted in E. BANDER, JUSTICE HOLMES Ex CATHED 2 (1966). Chief Justice Dixon did not find w hat he was looking for in re-r d
�A 09 
S t "Y . I d . . . 
ea Ing De enectu e: ou get more practlca a vice m the bulletm of the A.A.R.P. [A . 
Association of Retired Persons]," the Judge said to me with a smile. 
mencan 
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sions!"14 I once asked Justice Dixon what was his first thought 
when he drove home from Shreveport after his last election. His 
"I' ti " answer: m ree. 
We reach truth in law. What is the judge's essential func­
tion? What is t he nature of the judicial process at the supreme 
level of its practice? Is justice the soul of  the law? 
These are timeless questions. Unlike the art of woodcraft­
ing, the art of judgment is less measured, less certain, less exact. 
The law deals with words, with ideas, with abstractions. is It is 
easier, John Dixon would tell you, to build a ladder from a pic­
ture than to render judgment from real life. Both are challenges 
that the Judge enjoys, although he calls a ladder he made "a 
fool's ladder," since it took countless hours to make by hand 
what you could buy for thirty dollars. True enough, but no lad­
der bought at a hardware store tells you much about the charac­
ter of its owner. 
Common-law judges make law, but out of what? All judges 
interpret statutes, civilian jurists their codes, and The Nine in 
Washington our Constitution, but how? A good judge struggles 
to find answers to these questions. "Some of the most difficult 
cases have been those in which one of my brothers would remind 
me: 'The law is hard, but it is the law.' It seems to me that this 
is a good sign of injustice,"16 says Justice Dixon. "Is the law 
meant to be harsh? Does the lawmaker ever intend to be unjust? 
Does a civilized society demand this pound of flesh? If we 
judges could understand better ways to solve cases, we might not 
hear so often, 'Lex dur, sed lex.' "17 
Given brains and time-twenty years and a thousand cases 
are about enough-a great judge will make a contribution. 18 
14. M. CICERO, s upra note 6, at 145. 
15. Cf Fallon, Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1523, 1527 ("If moral values 'exist,' as surely they do in some senses of that term, they 
plainly do not exist in the same physical way 'in the fabric of the world'-as chairs, for 
example, do.") (footnote omitted). 
16. Dixon, Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 LA. L. REV. 
1661, 1677 (1982). 
17. Id. 
18. In one of his first important decisions, State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973) 
(on rehearing), Justice Dixon struggled with the meaning of LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:435 (West 1981): "The evidence must be relevant to the material issue." Justice 
Dixon pondered "the impact of this bland little sentence" upon proffered evidence of prior 
crimes as proof of guilt in criminal cases. Moore, 278 So. 2d at 785. �he ulti�ate r�sult 
was the formulation of Louisiana's restrictive prior crimes rule, with Justice Dixon 
reasoning: 
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Cardozo's Nature of the Judicial Process 19 comes to mind. Our 
own Judge Tate's The Justice Function of the Judge exposes the 
heart of the matter. 20 If I were to point you to an example of 
Justice Dixon's judicial mastery, I would point first to Splendour 
Shipping,21 where the Judge lifted Louisiana out of  the dark ages 
of sovereign immunity by the tool of his pen: 
Here the Board sues, and when Splendour reconvenes on a 
claim arising from the same accident, the Board cries, "King's 
X! You can't sue me." Not even the Board claims that its 
Evidence of previous criminal activity does affect the opinion of those who 
sit in judgment. In fact, evidence of prior criminal activity has such a strong 
influence on the finders of fact, reasonable or unreasonable, logical or illogical, 
that such evidence, for this reason and this reason alone, may be "too 
prejudicial." If the identity of the accused rapist is in doubt, it is too easy to 
believe that if he had committed such an offense before he would do so again. 
Rape is a horrible crime, committed by bad men. If the defendant committed 
such an offense before, it is too easy t o  believe that he is a bad man, and capable of 
the act with which he stands accused. 
Id. at 787. Moore's conviction was reversed: "The evidence of defendant's guilt of the rape 
of September 14 does not tend to show that he is the one who committed the rape of 
September 18." Id. at 788. 
One keen student of Justice Dixon's opinions, James F. Shuey, writing in a criminal 
justice seminar conducted by Professor Pugh, said of Moore: 
Justice Dixon thus recognized that human failings will prevent t h e  workings of 
justice from ever being ideal. But because of this, justice demands that every step 
be taken to reduce the potential for human error. The system of l a w  must com­
pensate for the failings of men, and the law itself must be a vital force. 
J. Shuey, John A. Dixon, Jr.-How a Justice Judges 22 (Spring 198 0) (unpublished manu· 
script on file with Professor George Pugh, LSU Law Center). Mr. Shuey's conclusion is u' 
comprehending as his survey is comprehensive: 
to the extent that Justice Dixon has defied ready characterization, he has suc­
ceeded as a judge. His fair and reasonable approach to cases, coupled with his 
seeming impatience towards legal sophistry, is directed to the perfection of a law 
that is plain and unadorned, and understood by the citizens whose lives it affects. 
Id. at 24 (quoted by permission). I am indebted to Mr. Shuey's research and to Profes\<•r 
Pugh's guidance in the preparation of this speech. 
19. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
20. Tate, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 So. U.L. REV. 250, 250 (1975): 
The adjudication in each case must result not only from an application of 
legal rule but, also, in what the judge feels to be a result that is as fair as possihle 
to the individual interests concerned. Because of this concern for a just result a.� 
well as a just process, sometimes the judge makes a choice or modification of 1 he 
legal rules available for his decision . ... As the trend toward a bureaucratized 
mass society continues, this justice function of the judge will, I predict, assume an 
even greater importance. 
Judge Tate cautions, however, that "[t]he performance of the justice function d0c<; , 
and. sh�uld not involve judicial impressioni_sm .. The judge is not to apply what is mere!\ 
1
�11� subjective preference rather than some objective rule of law." Id. at 253. · 
21. Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enters. Co., 27 3 So. 2d I q 11 . 
1973). 
·' 
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immunity is fair and just-only legal and traditional. ... But 
when an unfair doct�n� do� not function for the public good, 
but only for the admm1strat1ve convenience of a State agency, 
the court should do whatever it can to infuse justice in the rela­
tionship between the State agency and the private person. 22 
7 
And then there is the Baumgartner rule in tort, the "humanita­
rian doctrine" as it is called, which saves a tipsy pedestrian step­
ping off a curb from the onslaught of a negligent motorist. 23 In 
the hands of lesser judges, Baumgartner's contributory negli­
gence would have barred recovery. Not in Justice Dixon's 
hands: 
Since the operator of a motor vehicle is aware that he  
could meet many emergencies in  which pedestrians will not 
always act prudently and will sometimes be found in perilous 
situations, he should have the added burden of keeping the 
roads safe even for those who are negligently caught off their 
guard.24 
John Dixon had a great friend and companion in Al Tate 
and it moves me deeply to see their photograph, with Claire and 
Imo in view, in the retrospective exhibit put up by Librarian 
Billings and friends behind the Chief 's back. John Dixon 
learned much about judging from Al Tate;25 both believe in 
doing justice as a judge-never mind the skeptic who doubts his 
own soul. 26 But I sense that the tension between governing rule 
and right result, between judicial freedom and judicial con-
22. Id. at 25. 
23. Baumgartner v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400, 405 n.6 (La. 
1978). As Justice Dixon explained, 
By that doctrine the last clear chance rule was extended by charging the operator 
of a dangerous instrumentality with knowledge of a pedestrian's peril, whether he 
actually saw it or should have seen it. Thus, the motorist must exercise the 
highest degree of care rather than ordinary care, as is the usual case. The 
doctrine, in its original conception, represented an attempt to stress the greater 
importance of human safety over the convenience and financial interest of 
defendants. . . . We approve of the doctrine in its application to pedestrian­
motorist cases. 
Id. (citations omitted). Baumgartner has since been superseded by statute. Turner v. New 
Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 471 So. 2d 709, 714 (La. 1985) (Dixort, C.J.). 
24. Baumgartner, 356 So. 2d at 405. 
25. "Al was a great leader, and a great teacher." Dixon, In Memoriam: Honorable 
Albert Tate, Jr., 61 TUL. L. REV. 711, 712 (1987). 
26. Of his friend and companion on the bench Al Tate, Justice Dixon said: "His 
single-minded purpose in office was . . . to decide cases in a manner generally acceptable, 
according to Jaw, with justice and compassion." Id. at 712. As for his ow11 judicial 
method, Chief Justice Dixon has said, "insofar as I could understand justice, I tried to 
render a just decision." Dixon, supra note 16, at 1677. 
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straint, was harder for Judge Dixon than for Judge Tate.27 
Bothered by self-scrutiny and supremely honest, only Judge 
Dixon could describe the leap from selection of relevant facts­
and here was a master judicial reporter-and application of 
appropriate law to the just result as "bumbling, struggling, 
stumbling, muddling, trying one solution and then a nother until 
one seemed right."28 This from Justice Dixon's Louisiana Law 
Review article Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Loui­
siana,29 which he calls in his wry way "a non-treatise by a non­
scholar on a non-subject."30 
Here I must mention my dear colleague Julio Cueto-Rua's 
vital contribution to Judge Dixon's thinking, which has sparked 
a strong friendship between them, as well as u nderstanding. 
Goethe says that two wise men can tell each other all they know 
in a couple of days. 31 Julio's system of axiology-the study of 
the nature and types of value judgment-as an aid to judicial 
interpretation puts into words what great judges sense instinc­
tively. 32 After studying Cueto-Rua's book Judicial Methods of 
27. For a "bard case" that divides Dixon and Tate, JJ., see Cates v. Beauregard Elec. 
Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976), in which Justice Dixon, writing for the court, held that a 
youth's contributory negligence barred a tort recovery for injuries received when he 
climbed a utility pole and cut an electric wire under the mistaken assumption that there 
were no live wires: 
By either subjective or objective standard, Larry's fault is clear. A 
reasonable person should have known the risk involved in shinnying up a pole to 
cut an electric wire. Larry knew something about electricity. He was reminded 
of the danger by his companion as he climbed the pole, but apparently assumed 
that there were no live wires on the pole. He was not entitled to such an 
assumption. 
Id. at 370. 
Judge Tate dissented from entry of summary judgment in favor of the utility company: 
"The majority errs in finding that there is no issue of fact with regard to the contributory 
negligence of Larry Cates, the sixteen-year old minor for whose injuries recovery is 
sought." Id. at 37 1 (Tate, J., dissenting) . 
. S�e also Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981) (on rehearing), in which the maJonty'. �r Lemmon, J., departed from precedent to create a wrongful death action for prenatal tnjury to a fetus subsequently born dead. Said Chief Justice Dixon in dissent: "In 
th� civil law, our :ode has provided a consistent and symmetrical concept for the relation­
ships of persons with unborn children, with no indication that an exception should be made 
in the case �f the wrongful death of a fetus." Id. at 639 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting). 
28. Dixon, supra note 16, at 1677. 
29. Dixon, supra note 16. 
30. Id. at 1667. 
31. Holmes, supra note 1, at 154. 
32. "I have never consciously decided a case by following the method described by 
Cueto-Rua." Dixon, supra note 16, at 1676. Chief Justice Dixon adds: 
lawyers are not born judges, and judges are seldom taught how to decide cases. 
Our efforts to balance the legitimate interests of society are usually crude, 
1990] DEDICA TION 9 
Interpretation of the Law, Chief Justice Dixon was moved to say 
in its Preface: "Every judge should be aware of the reality of 
justice." 33 
If I may add a word of my own about vaiue judgment in the 
life of the law, I would say that order and freedom are weighed 
differently by different men. Cueto-Rua is an enthusiast of 
objective justice, objectively achieved. 34 Judge Dixon is wise to 
remain doubtful: "It is almost a contradiction in terms to speak 
of the thought and action of a human being as 'objective.' A 
man's thoughtful decisions are a product of his whole life and 
his whole environment,"35 says Justice Dixon. I have no doubt 
that paratrooper John Dixon's capture in Sicily, his attempted 
escape, and his imprisonment for twenty-one months put free­
dom above order i n  his world of juridical values. The roots of 
State v. Saia 36 run deep. I quote: "The 'right to be let alone,' as 
Justice Brandeis phrased it, is of the utmost importance in a free 
society. The police cannot interfere with this right unless specifi­
cally authorized by a judicial officer or under narrowly drawn 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend­
ment."37 Justice Dixon has been a watchful guardian of freedom 
on this court. Measured by his own standards, he has succeeded 
magnificently: "I'd like to do my part to keep this a free coun­
try. Too many people are frightened, too many people place a 
much greater value on security than upon freedom and 
liberty."38 
A word about Justice Dixon's style and I reach my 
conclusion. 
Buffon, the pre-eminent French theorist of style, teaches 
elemental and narrow, because axiology-the study of the nature and types of 
value judgments-is foreign to us. 
For this reason the good judge will never cease his efforts to understand the 
juridical values at work in the cases before him. Cueto-Rua's description of those 
values, the relationships among them and their part in the judicial process is an 
essential aid to the judge seeking a solution to the hard case. 
Dixon, Preface to J. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 
at x (1981) [hereinafter Dixon, Preface]. 
33. Dixon, Preface, supra note 32, at x. 
34. "The one best solution to the case before the judge is the one that will realize all 
the positive juridical values in a properly balanced way. This best solution, says the author, 
is an objective solution, made so by the process. Justice, then, is done." Id. 
35. Dixon, supra note 16, at 1677. 
36. 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974). 
37. Id. at 873. 
38. Roberts, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Supremes, Gris Gris, 
May 1-7, 1978, at 15, col. 3. 
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that "style is the man himself": "le style est de l'homme 
mime."39 John Dixon is an ascetic, as Justice Brandeis was an 
ascetic. He lives plainly; he gives all his might to his judicial 
duty. His office is unadorned, almost bare, except for stacks of 
writ applications and draft opinions within arm's reach on his 
right. There are a few court pictures on the wall opposite his 
desk. Above them is a larger photograph of Imogene and the 
girls. On his left, a bookcase contains Strunk and White's The 
Elements of Style, with its rule 17 ("Omit needless words! Omit 
needless words! Omit needless words!"40) and Bruce and Wil­
liam Catton's The Bold and Magnificent Dream,41 Doubleday's 
basic history of the United States. I peeked into this book with 
the help of Mrs. Dandridge, the Judge's secretary, when the 
Judge was out of his office. You can size up a man from what he 
underlines in a book.42 Here is one passage tha t  caught Judge 
Dixon's eye: 
For in America the idea was that the sky was the limit­
that a society of free people in a new, untrammeled land could 
in fact do and be anything it chos�id not seem farf etched in 
39. "Ces choses sont hors de l'homme, le style est de l'homme mime." G. BUFFON, 
Discours de Reception ti l'Academie (Paris 1753), quoted in J. GENUNG, THE WORKING 
PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC 19 n.l (1900). F or a general treatment of the style element in 
judicial opinions, see P. BAIER, THE IDEA OF STYLE IN APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
(2d tent. ed. 1977). 
40. w. STRUNK & E.B . WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE at xiii (3d ed . 1979). 
41. B. CATTON & W. CATION, THE BoLO AND MAGNIFICENT DREAM (1978). 
42. What one reads is also a clue to character. On the eve of retirement, Chief Justice 
Dixon completed a thick essay by Professor Richard Fallon, Of Speakable Ethics and 
Constitutional Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1523 (1989), a review of Michael Perry's 
MORALITY, PoLmcs, AND LAW (1988). A copy of Professor Fallon's article was on Chief 
Justice Dixon's desk at the time I surveyed his office. The Fallon article addresses "Hard 
Questions": 
What is morality? Is it objective or subjective? Docs it make sense to talk about 
moral "truth"? If so, by virtue of what are moral truths true? How should the 
Court discover moral truth? And, if the Justices can discover truth h o w  should 
they bring it to bear on constitutional cases in which factors such as �onstitutional 
text, history, and precedent are also relevant? 
Fallon, suf!�a, at 1525. That Chief Justice Dixo n  should ponder these questions a few days �fo�e. retm�g, suggests an extraordinary mind. One is reminded of Justice Brandeis's mqumng �md and workways as a judge: "Knowledge is essential to  understanding, and 
understandtng �hould precede judging." Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Justice P�al Calogero, who succeeded John Dixon as chief justice spoke for the court at the retrrement proceed' · "J h 
' 
w Id th 
mgs, saymg: o n would always teach us the things of the ,::r
. 
so at we could better understand the things before us " F inch La Chief Justice rr'aised as Man oif Ideas u t T' p· 
· 
' · 
3. 
• near 
' tmes- tcayune (New Orleans), Mar. 28, 1990, at 83, col. 
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the late eightee�th century. In America, realist and visionary 
were one and mseparable because the loftiest of visions had 
enough of reality in it to seem plausible. 
Here lay the basis of a faith that could move mountains. 
The course of human events had reached one of its decisive 
turning poi
.
nts, and a great deal of human history for the next 
two centunes (and beyond) was going to be different because 
the men of 1776 had first enunciated the dream, in phrases that 
still contain fire-liberty, equality, pursuit of happiness, 
unalienable human rights-and had then proceeded to show 
that it just might work.43 
11 
Justice Dixon is a tall exponent of this same faith. He 
rejects the rule: "Do what others do, because they do it; do what 
one is told-standard actions, standard rules, little experimenta­
tion; no expansion in life, no flexibility."44 As a judge on this 
court, John Dixon has stressed that "individualization is essen­
tial and that each individual has a right to his own hopes and 
dreams. "45 
As for Judge Dixon's judicial opinions, they are as plain as 
the Shaker table from which he eats. "He says what he has to 
say, and that's it," says Mrs. Dandridge, his long-time secretary. 
Justice Dixon writes opinions as he builds furniture. Both are 
functional; both work. His opinions, especially his dissents, are 
elegant and powerful because of the ir simplicity. 46 
I can pay Justice Dixon no higher tribute than to compare 
his writing favorably to Justice Hugo Black's. Both are judges of 
deep conviction, not afraid to enforce absolutes against Govern-
43. B. CATTON & W. CATION, THE BOLD AND MAGNIFICENT DREAM: AMERICA'S 
FOUNDING YEARS 1492-1815, at 309 (1978). 
44. Dixon, supra note 16, at 1673. 
45. Id. 
46. E.g. , " 'Serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value' is  not an acceptable 
standard by which to measure criminal conduct in Louisiana." State v. Amato, 343 So. 2d 
698, 705 (La. 1977) (Dixon, J., dissenting). "There can be no knowing and intelligent 
waiver of a constitutional right by such a psychotic retardate as this defendant." State v. 
Trudell, 350 So. 2d 658, 664 (La. 1977) (Dixon, J., dissenting), overruled sub nom. State v. 
Williams, 383 So. 2d 369 (La. 1980). "The record is clear that defendant did not know the 
difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. A civilized people should not 
ascribe legal responsibility to such an insane person even if he kills a Catholic priest." State 
v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1179 (La. 1979) (Dixon, J., dissenting). "The opinion 
says the police may stop one whom they 'reasonably suspect.' It is not a quibble to note 
that 'to suspect' is not 'to believe.'" State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1200 (La. 1983) 
(Dixon, C.J., dissenting). . . . 
I owe the Abercrombie reference to my colleague George Pugh, a long-time fnend and 
admirer of Chief Justice Dixon, who mentioned Abercrombie as an example of Dixon's 
mastery in dissent. 
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ment. In Bartkus v. Jllinois,41 Justice Bl�ck thought the rule 
that allows two sovereigns to try a �an .tw1�e for the same con­duct an outrage and said so loudly m his dissent. I quote: 
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less fo� two 
"Sovereigns" to inflict it than for ?ne. If danger to the mno­
cent is emphasized, that danger 1s surely no less when the 
power of the State and Federal Governments is brought to bear 
on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sovereigns" 
proceeds alone. In each case, inescapably, a man is forced to 
face danger twice for the same conduct.48 
Justice Dixon's dissent in a case involving the same issue is 
equally plain, equally strong: 
All the reasons which support the prohibition against 
double jeopardy are applicable when a defendant is prosecuted 
in the state system and federal system for the same offense. 
Only the fiction of dual sovereignty supports the majority 
holding. 
A genuine adherence to the constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy would prevent this dual prosecution.49 
Justice Dixon is not afraid to dissent alone when conviction 
requires it. I like that in a judge. In one case, he answered the 
majority in one stark sentence: "All it would take to make this 
search legal is a warrant."50 On certiorari the United Sates 
Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court, paying 
Chief Justice Dixon the high tribute of quoting his Shaker sen­
tence-in its exquisite entirety. 51 
I reach my conclusion. 
If I may judge his service, Chief Justice Dixon has contrib­
uted mightily to this court's stature. We are fortunate to have 
had him as our chief justice. I have no doubt that he will be 
remembered as he would wish: "hard-working, intellectually 
honest, a humanitarian." This is how he answered when I asked 
�he question. I would add that he will be recalled as a great 
Judge because of "his integrity, his strength of character, his wis­
dom, . the knowle�ge of his wisdom"-this is how Hugo Black 
descnbed power m a man. 52 As Louisiana's chief justice, John 
47. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
48. Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting). 
49. State v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 160, 163 (La. 1978) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting). 50. State v. Thompson 448 So 2d 666 673 (La) (D' c · · ''d 469 U.S. 17 (1984). 
' 
· 
• 
· 1xon, .J
.
, 
d1ssentmg), rev , 
51. Tho?1pson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 n.2 (1984). 52. Just!ce Black and the Bill o>f Right• (CBS N t I · · b d D 3 J ews e ev1s1on roa cast, ec. , 
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Dixon fits this description. He also measures up to his own rig­
orous standards: "A man recognized for his knowledge, experi­
ence, cour age and �isdom has power. He not only commands, 
he persuades. He is a leader."53 
Those of you who know Dickens's Cricket on the Hearth 54 
will see much of the cricket spirit in John Dixon the man. The 
book's subtitle, to paraphrase it only slightly to fit this occasion, 
is "A Family Tale of Home." It tells the story of a father who 
pictured to his blind daughter whom he so much loved his envi-
1968). The transcript of the television broadcast is printed in 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 937 (1977), 
and an uncut, three-hour recording is on file with the author. The hour-long actual 
broadcast was the first television interview with a sitting Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 937; 
see Baier, Introduction to Hugo Black: A Memorial Portrait, 1982 SUP. Cr. HIST. Soc'Y 
Y.B. 72, 73 n.15. 
53. Dixon, supra note 16, at 1672. 
On learning of Chief Justice Dixon's pending retirement, Professor Cueto-Rua wrote 
him a letter. It stated: 
Dear Chief Justice: 
I read in the local newspaper that you are going to retire. To tell you the 
truth, the news caused mixed feelings. I was glad because you have completed an 
important stage of your life, surrounded by the admiration and recognition of 
your people, and the Bench's and the Bar's. I was sorry because a man of 
experience, knowledge and devotion to the performance of his duties as the 
highest judicial officer of the State, was to put an end to his activities. 
Please, accept the congratulations of an Argentine lawyer who had the 
privilege of your cooperation and guidance, and the hopes of a law professor, who 
expects that a clear mind, as yours, will continue to advance the cause of a better 
understanding among human beings. 
Letter from Julio Cueto-Rua to John A. Dixon, Jr. (Mar. 6, 1990) (on file with the Tulane 
Law Review) (quoted with permission). 
Chief Justice Dixon's handwritten response is telling. It speaks of the anticipation of 
retirement and the reality of justice learned over time: 
Dear Julio, 
Thank you for the very kind letter of March 6. This last month has been 
busy & unexpectedly pleasant. Many years ago I became reconciled to retirement 
at age 70 because of the mandatory retirement provision of Ar[t]. 5 § 23B (La 
Const of 1974). My brothers on this court decided (erroneously) that it did not 
apply to judges in office when the new constitution went into effect. [Giepert v. 
Wingerter, 531 So. 2d 754 (La. 1988).] As time passed reconciliation became 
anticipation. I could hardly wait until 8 April. 
Now I can spend more time with children & grandchildren, and regain con-
trol over my own time. 
To you, [P]rofessor, I have a profound debt. You introduced me to a system 
of thinking about "Justice" in deciding cases that I would not have found on my 
own. It has helped me in my work and has made "justice" more of a reality & 
less of a mere ideal. I leave this office with a greater respect for law and the 
judicial system than I had when I entered, thanks largely to you. , 
Letter from John A. Dixon, Jr., to Julio Cueto-Rua (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with the Tulane 
Law Review) (quoted with permission). 
54. C. DICKENS, THE CRICKET ON THE HEARTH: A FAIRY TALE OF HOME 
(London 1846). 
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ronment as one of prosperity and aflluence. I will end my sprig 
of laurel by saying of Louisiana's Chief Justice John Allen 
Dixon, Jr., what I said of Edward Douglass White, Chief Justice 
of the United States, on an earlier occasion:55 
And all was Caleb's doing; all the doing of her simple 
father! But he too had a Cricket on his Hearth .... For all the 
Cricket Tribe are potent Spirits, even though the people who 
hold converse with them do not know it (which is frequently 
the case); and there are not in the Unseen World, Voices more 
gentle and more true; that may be so implicitly relied on, or 
that are so certain to give none but tenderest counsel; a s  the 
Voices in which the Spirits of the Fireside and the Hearth, 
address themselves to human kind. 56 
Judge Dixon, my fervent hope is that the proceedings 
today, the exhibit in the Law Library, and these few w ords spo­
ken from my heart will add gold to the sunset. 
55. Baier, Edward Douglass Wh · . F. (oration for the unveiling of th R 
ite. 
h 
�amefo�aPortrait,43 LA. L. REV. 1001 (1983) 
Supreme Court, Oct. 29, 1982).
e osent a portrait of E.D. White, before the Louisiana 
56. C. DICKENS, supra note 54 t 57 b . 1016-17. 
'a 'su stantial/yquoted in Baier, supra note 55, at 
